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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

groundwater. The Second Circuit determined the movement of soils
pursuant to a state or federal remediation program does not constitute
an introduction of substances under RCRA.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of SRA's
federal claims.
William H. Fronczak
FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding
sidecasting in a wetland is a discharge of a pollutant that violates the
Clean Water Act).
The United States sued James and Rebecca Deaton ("Deatons") for
allegedly violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by polluting a
wetland. The Deatons purchased a twelve-acre parcel of land in
Wicomico County, Maryland, to develop a residential subdivision. The
Wicomico County Health Department denied the Deatons' request for
a sewage disposal permit because the groundwater elevations were too
high and the drainage on the majority of the parcel was too poor. The
Deatons consulted the U.S. Department of Agriculture Soil
Conservation Service ("SCS"). A site examiner suggested that digging
a ditch through the middle of the property could correct the wetness
problem.
Before commencing any ditching work, the District Conservationist
at the SCS in Wicomico County further inspected the property. He
saw evidence of wetlands, including hydric soils, areas of standing
water, a large low wet area in the center of the parcel, and non-tidal
wetlands. He advised the Deatons that since wetlands existed on their
property, they would need to obtain a permit from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") in order to begin digging. The Deatons
ignored this advice and hired a contractor to dig a 1,240-foot ditch
across the wetlands to drain the area. The contractor performed
sidecasting, a practice where the excavated dirt is piled on either side
of the ditch.
After learning of possible CWA violations on the Deaton property,
a Corps ecologist inspected the site. He concluded that wetlands were
present on the property and that all work should stop until the
Deatons obtained the requisite permit. The Deatons unsuccessfully
applied for a permit and thereafter spent three years working with
consultants to examine the property, negotiate with the Corps, and
prepare a remediation plan. With no remediation ever conducted on
the property, the government filed a civil complaint against the
Deatons for violation of the CWA for pollution of a regulated wetland.
The district court initially granted partial summary judgment to
the government. The district court concluded that any wetlands on
the Deatons' property were subject to the CWA and that sidecasting
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excavated material into those wetlands involved the discharge of a
pollutant in violation of the CWA. The district court then vacated this
determination based upon a subsequent decision and granted
summary judgment for the Deatons. The government appealed. The
Deatons cross-appealed the district court's original rulings.
The narrow issue in this case involved whether sidecasting, the
deposit of dredged or excavated material from a wetland back into
that same wetland, constituted the discharge of a pollutant under the
CWA. The Fourth Circuit first assumed that the Deatons' property
contained CWA protected wetlands. The court then resorted to the
provisions of the CWA itself. The CWA prohibits the discharge,
without a permit, of any pollutant into navigable waters, which
includes wetlands. "Discharge of a pollutant" means "any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." The CWA
further defines "pollutant" to include "dredged spoil" that has been
"discharged into water." The court found the piles of dirt dredged up
by the Deatons' contractor were clearly "pollutants" within this
definition.
The contested issue involved the meaning of "discharge of a
pollutant." The Deatons argued the word "addition" in the phrase
"addition of any pollutant" required the introduction of new material
into the area. Thus, they argued they did not discharge a pollutant
because sidecasting only deposited material that was already present in
the wetland. The court rejected this contention and explained that
once the Deatons removed the nonpollutant material by sidecasting it
became dredged spoil, a statutory pollutant. Most importantly, the
court stated the redeposit of the material excavated from the wetland
into that same wetland added a pollutant where none had been
before. The underlying rationale for defining dredged spoil as a
pollutant as determined by Congress and the decisions of other
jurisdictions supported the conclusion of the court. The court also
determined it did not have jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by
the Deatons in their cross-appeal because its disposition on the
government's issue restored the case to the district court's original
order, which was nonfinal and nonappealable. Therefore, the court
held the CWA's definition of the discharge of a pollutant encompassed
sidecasting in a wetland and remanded the case.
Vanessa L. Condra

SIXTH CIRCUIT
Adams County Reg'l Water Dist. v. Vill. of Manchester, 226 F.3d 513
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding one village's contract to sell water to another
village violated the Farmers Home Administration's protection of rural
water associations).

